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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
GEORGE RONALD WRIGHT, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. ' 
WESTSIDE NURSERY, a Utah 1 
limited partnership, and 
DARRELL HUMPHRIES, an 
individual, 
Case No, 880544-CA 
Defendants and Respondents, 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by Utah Code 
Ann, § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1953, as amended). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Humphries adopts the nature of the proceedings as 
stated by Wright. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Is Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure clear and unambiguous concerning costs on appeal. 
2. Given the language of Rule 34 of Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure and this Court's prior decision, did 
the trial court on remand have any discretion in awarding 
costs on appeal, 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
refusing to modify attorney's fees awarded Humphries at 
trial? 
4. Is this appeal so frivolous that attorney's fees 
should be awarded Humphries on this second appeal. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
There are no Constitutional provisions at issue. Rule 
3 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure is controlling 
and is attached as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Humphries adopts Wright's Statement of the Case, but 
adds the following clarifications: 
1. At the hearing on remand, Humphries' counsel took 
the position that (a) because costs were not awarded by 
this Court and (b) Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure cannot be construed as awarding Wright costs, 
there was no need to file an objection to Wright's 
Memorandum of Costs. It was therefore improper for Wright 
to seek costs based on a reading of this Court's decision 
and Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
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2. The trial court correctly followed the directive 
of this Court and awarded Wright $8,152.50 for attorney's 
fees incurred on appeal. 
3. Humphries' counsel also suggested (in argument 
that was not recorded by the court reporter) that: 
A. The jury had already reduced attorney's fees 
based on the equities of this matter. Such a decision 
by the jury or the court is within the province of the 
fact finder. 
B. Post-verdict and while the jury was still 
impaneled, Wright failed to make inquiry why the jury 
reduced attorney's fees, or on what issue attorney's 
fees were awarded. Failure to make that inquiry 
constitutes waiver. 
C. The burden was on Wright to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence why and how attorney's 
fees should be reduced. There was conflicting 
testimony at the remand hearing on the attorney's fees 
incurred by Humphries for the issues Wright prevailed 
on in his appeal. Wright failed to meet his burden, 
and the Court would not speculate in that area. 
4. The Court of Appeals' decision did not mandate a 
reduction of attorney's fees. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The trial court found that Wright failed to meet his 
burden on remand on the issue of a reduction in attorney's 
fees awarded Humphries at trial. The court refused to 
speculate in that area. (T.24, 25). (See Order Assessing 
Attorney's Fees Incurred on Appeal, Directing Disbursements 
of Supersedeas Bond and Exonerating Preliminary Injunction, 
Addendum B). 
A trial court's finding of fact, whether based on oral 
or documentary evidence, will not be set aside on appeal 
unless clearly erroneous. Copper State Leasing Co. v. 
Blacker Appl. and Farn. Co., 770 P.2d 88 (Utah 1988); 
Western Kane County Spec. Servicer District v. Jackson 
Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1377 (Utah 1987); Porter v. Groover, 
734 P.2d 434, 435 (Utah 1987). 
A trial court's finding is clearly erroneous when, 
although there is evidence to support it, the court 
reviewing all the record evidence is left with a definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. The 
Appellate Court may regard a finding as clearly erroneous 
only if the finding is without adequate evidentiary support 
or induced by an erroneous view of the law. State v. 
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); Western Capital v. 
Knudsvig, 768 P.2d 989 (Utah 1989). 
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In order to challenge a trial court's finding of fact, 
an appellant must first marshal all the evidence that 
supports the findings and then demonstrate that, despite 
this evidence, they are so lacking in support as to be 
"against the clear weight of the evidence" andf thus, 
clearly erroneous. In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885 
(Utah 1989). This marshaling of the evidence is a 
prerequisite to the Appellate Court's determination of 
whether the findings are clearly erroneous. Cornish Town 
v. Koller, 758 P.2d 919 (Utah 1988); Fitzgerald v. 
Critchfield, 744 P.2d 301, 304 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Humphries submits that Wright has clearly failed to 
meet the standard for review established by this Court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly interpreted Rule 34 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and this Court's decision 
on the issue of costs. The trial court had no discretion 
to award costs. 
The trial court properly applied its discretion in 
denying Wright's attempt to reduce attorney's fees awarded 
Humphries at trial. 
This appeal is so frivolous that Humprhies should be 
awarded attorney's fees. Alternatively, Humphries is 
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entitled to attorney's fees as the prevailing party if he 
prevails on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WRIGHT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO NOR WAS HE 
AWARDED COSTS ON THE PRIOR APPEAL 
In Appellant's Brief, Wright totally disregards the 
language of Rule 3 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure and the holding of this Court on the prior 
appeal. 
Rule 34(a) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure states 
as follows: 
To whom awarded., Except as otherwise provided by 
lav;, if an appeal is dismissed, costs shall be 
taxed against the appellant unless otherwise 
agreed by the peirties or ordered by the court; if 
a judgment or order is affirmed, costs shall be 
taxed against appellant unless otherwise ordered; 
if a judgment or order is reversed, costs shall 
be taxed against the appellee unless otherwise 
ordered; if a judgment or order is affirmed or 
reversed in part, or is vacated, costs shall be 
allowed as ordered by the court. Costs shall not 
be allowed or taxed in a criminal case. 
(Emphasis added). 
Applying the rule to the instant matter, we find that 
the Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
In that situation, costs are allowed only as ordered by the 
court. The Court of Appeals awarded no costs. Rule 34 and 
the decision by this Court could not be more clear. 
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Wright suggests that Humphries had an obligation to 
object to Wright's bill of costs and failure to do so 
constitutes waiver. That claim is best responded to by the 
following question: If Rule 34 is to the effect that in a 
case which is affirmed in part and reversed in part, costs 
are only awarded when specifically allowed by the court, 
why should a litigant have to object (thus incurring 
additional attorney's fees) when what is sought is not 
allowed in the first place? To hold otherwise will cause 
an objection to be made every time a party is not awarded 
costs but still seeks them, resulting in additional 
pleadings, hearings before the court, and attorney's fees 
to the client. It will also cause the opposing party to 
seek Rule 11 sanctions which may in fact be appropriate. 
Wright also fails to recognize the underlying reason 
why Rule 34 is written as it is. The rule simply 
recognizes that the when a case is affirmed in part or 
reversed in part, the issue of costs is left for decision 
by the Appellate Court. Failure to award costs is a clear 
indication by the court that it duly considered whether or 
not costs should be awarded, and made a conscious decision 
that neither party should be awarded costs. Stated another 
way, when a case is reversed and affirmed in part, both 
parties prevailed on appeal and neither party should be 
penalized by an award of costs. 
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POINT II 
WRIGHT FAILED TO MEET HIS BURDEN AT THE REMAND 
HEARING ON THE ATTORNEY'S FEES ISSUE 
The Appellate Court in the prior appeal correctly 
recognized that Humphries was to be properly regarded as 
the party who prevailed at trial and was thus entitled to 
attorney's fees. Wright v. Humphries, 787 P.2d 508, 517 
(Utah 1990) . However, this Court did not mandate that a 
reduction of attorney's fees was required on remand, but 
merely suggested that some adjustment may be necessary, Id. 
at 517. This Court recognized that it would be Wright's 
burden to persuade the trial court that (1) sufficient 
proof existed in the; form of itemized billings or other 
proof that would be applicable to the issues on which 
Humphries did not prevail; and (2) Wright would have to 
overcome the legal consequences of (a) submitting the issue 
of attorney's fees to the jury in the form of a general 
verdict as to fees, emd (b) failing to make inquiry to the 
jury post-verdict but before discharge, on what issue 
attorney's fees were awarded and how much. 
Even though Humphries' attorney submitted as an 
exhibit at the time of the original trial a copy of all 
attorney's fees billed to Humphries, no attempt was made by 
Wright at the remand hearing to show what work was done by 
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Humphries1 counsel on a particular day which was 
attributable to a specific issue, (T. 15-20). 
There was conflicting testimony at the remand hearing 
on the issue of attorney fees. Humphries' attorney 
testified that because of the complexity of the litigation 
and the numerous issues involved, it was impossible for him 
to determine how much time he incurred on the fraud issue. 
(T.18, 19). The time Wright's counsel incurred in 
defending the issue has no relevance to what Humphries 
incurred. The trial court apparently weighed all the 
evidence presented and found that Wright had failed to meet 
the burden of proof required. 
This case was so complex and interwoven that it was 
impossible to separate out attorney's fees incurred on a 
specific matter. The conflicting evidence at the remand 
hearing, coupled with the trial court's recognition that 
the jury had already reduced the attorney's fee sought by 
Humphries from 30,000 to $10,000 was evidence enough to the 
trial court that it should not speculate and merely guess 
on an appropriate reduction of attorney's fees. Since the 
trial court would not speculate, this Court should avoid 
the urge to do so. As stated by the trial court at the 
remand hearing: 
The jury awarded $10,000 out of the 30,000 plus 
that was requested by Mr. Chamberlain, and they 
were not requested to give any explanation as to 
why they reduced the requested attorney's fees. 
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I'm required under this decision to 
determine whether or not the $10r000 
award of attorney's fees ought to be 
reduced further, in light of the fact 
that Mr* Wright has prevailed on the 
fraud claim, and that's been reversed 
by the Court of Appeals—the jury's 
finding on that has been reversed. 
Since we can't guess why the jury found 
the $10,000 fee in the first place, I'm 
not going to guess on whether or not 
that should be reduced. I don' t know 
if there was any of that $10,0 00 that 
was awarded on the fraud claim,. 
As I said, I can say that if I were 
making the determination, the 
attorney's fee would have been higher, 
and it would have included, in all 
likelihood, some fees for the 
litigation on the fraud claim, which I 
would have reduced now, in light of the 
fact that the fraud claim has been 
overturned. But I can't assume that 
the same procedure would be followed 
with regard to the jury. There fore, 
I'm going to allow the $10,000 
attorney's fee to stand. (T. 24, 25). 
(Emphasis added). 
The issue of attorney's fees incurred by Humphries has 
been decided by both the jury and the trial court. It 
would be improper for this Court to substitute its judgment 
for both of these fact finders who have heard the evidence 
first hand. 
POINT III 
HUMPHRIES IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S 
FEES ON THIS APPEAL 
Wright's appeal on both issues is without merit. 
Humphries should therefore be awarded his attorney's fees 
10 
and costs on this second appeal. Since this case is a 
continuation of a case where attorney's fees were 
appropriate in the first instance, they are likewise 
appropriate now, but only if requested by a party. Wright 
has not requested an award of attorney's fees in this 
appeal and it would therefore be error for this Court to 
award attorney's fees to Wright even if he prevails on this 
appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should deny Wright's claim for costs. The 
Court should also reject Wright's suggestion that this 
Court substitute its judgment for the trial court and 
determine an appropriate reduction for attorney's fees 
awarded Humphries. 
Neither of Wright's arguments are supported by the 
evidence or by law. Humphries should be awarded his 
attorney's fees and costs on this appeal. It is important 
to note that Wright has not requested attorney's fees on 
this appeal. A^ 
DATED this ; day of August, 1990. 
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE 
Hans Q. Chamberlain 
Attorney for Respondents 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the *7(/fr\ day of August, 
1990, I did personally mail four true and correct copies of 
the above and foregoing RESPONDENTS1 BRIEF to Gary W. 
Pendleton, Attorney for Appellant, at 150 North 200 East, 
suite 202, St. George, Utah 84770. 
Hans Q. Chamberlain 
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ADDENDUM A 
Rule 34/ Award of costs. 
(a) To w h o m al lowed. Except as otherwise provided by law, if an appeal is 
dismissed, costs shall be taxed against the appellant unless otherwise agreed 
by the parties or ordered by the court; if a judgment or order is affirmed, casts 
shall be taxed'against appellant unless otherwise ordered; if a judgme'ntjor 
order is reversed, costs shall be taxed against the appellee unless otherwise 
ordered; if a judgment or order is affirmed or reversed in part, or is vacated, 
costs shall be allowed as ordered by the court. Costs shall not be allowed or 
taxed in a criminal case. 
(b) Costs for a n d aga ins t the s ta te of Utah- In cases involving the state 
of Utah or an agency or officer thereof, an award of costs for or against the 
state shall be at the discretion of the court unless specifically required or 
prohibited by law. 
(c) Costs of br iefs a n d a t t achments , r ecord , b o n d s a n d o t h e r ex-
penses on appea l . The following may be taxed as costs in favor of the pre-
vailing party in the appeal: the actual costs of a printed or typewritten brief or 
memoranda and attachments not to exceed $3.00 for each page; actual costs 
incurred in the preparation and transmission of the record, including costs of 
the reporter's transcript unless otherwise ordered by the court; premiums paid 
for supersedeas or cost bonds to preserve rights pending appeal; and the fees 
for filing and docketing the appeal. 
(d) Bill of cos ts t axed after remit t i tur . When costs are awarded to a party 
in an appeal, a party claiming costs shall, within 15 days after the remittitur 
is filed with the clerk of the trial court, serve upon the adverse party and file 
ivith the clerk of the trial court an itemized and verified bill of costs. The 
Adverse party may, within 5 days of service of the bill of costs, serve and file a 
notice of objection, together with a motion to have the costs taxed by the t r ial 
court. If there is no objection to the cost bill within the allotted time, the clerk 
of the trial court shall tax the costs as filed and enter judgment for the party 
gntitled thereto, which judgment shall be entered in the judgment docket with 
the same force and effect as in the case of other judgments of record. If the cost 
bill of the prevailing party is timely opposed, the clerk, upon reasonable notice 
and.hearing, shall tax the costs and enter a final determination and judgment 
frhichshall thereupon be entered in the judgment docket with the same force 
and effect as in the case of other judgments of record. The determination of the 
clerk shall be reviewable by the trial court upon the request of either party 
made within 5 days of the entry of the judgment. 
(e) Costs in o the r p roceed ings a n d agency appeals . In all other mat ters 
before the court, including appeals from an agency, costs may be allowed as in 
cases on appeal from a trial court. Within 15 days after the expiration of the 
time in which a petition for rehearing may be filed or within 15 days after an 
brder denying such a petition, the party to whom costs have been awarded 
may file with the clerk of the appellate court and serve upon the adverse party 
an itemized and verified bill of costs. The adverse party may, within 5 days 
after the service of the bill of costs file a notice of objection and a motion to 
have the costs taxed by the clerk. If no objection to the cost bill is filed within 
ihe allotted time, the clerk shall thereupon tax the costs and enter judgment 
against the adverse party. If the adverse party timely objects to the cost bill, 
the clerk, upon reasonable notice and hearing, shall determine and settle the 
costs, tax the same, and a judgment shall be entered thereon against the 
adverse party. The determination by the clerk shall be reviewable by the 
court upon the request of either party made within 5 days of the entry of 
judgment; unless otherwise ordered, oral argument shall not be permitted. A 
judgment under this section may be filed with the clerk of any district court in 
the state, who shall docket a certified copy of the same in the manner and 
with the same force and effect as judgments of the district court. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur\ 2d Appeal and C.J.S. — 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 1979. 
Error §§ 1009 to 1024. Key Numbers. — Costs «=» 221 et seq. 
ADDENDUM B 
GARY W. PENDLETON USB #2564 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
150 North Second East, Suite 202 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Ph: 628-4411 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE RONALD WRIGHT, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
WESTSIDE NURSERY, a Utah ] 
limited partnership and 
DARREL HUMPHRIES, an ] 
individual, 
Defendant. 
| ORDER ASSESSING ATTORNEY'S 
FEES INCURRED ON APPEAL, 
) DIRECTING DISBURSEMENTS OF 
SUPERSEDEAS BOND AND 
) EXONERATING PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION BOND 
) Civil No. 85-0536 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing 
on Plaintiff's motion to reduce the attorney's fees awarded to 
Defendants at trial and to assess attorney's fees reasonably 
incurred on appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. Plaintiff 
appeared in person and by and through his attorney, Gary W. 
Pendleton and Defendants appeared by and through their attorneyf 
Hans Q. Chamberlain. The Court having heard the statements of 
counsel and having taken evidence regarding the issue of attorney's 
fees and having reviewed the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals 
and being fully advised in the premises entered the following 
orders: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
attorney's fees awarded Defendants at trial are not reduced because 
•DO m\ ?.? nn 10 23 
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the jury was not requested to disclose the* basis of their award of 
the attorney's fees and the Court is not going to speculate in that 
area. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
Plaintiff recover from Defendant the sum of $8,152.50 as 
reimbursement for attorney's fees reasonably incurred on appeal to 
the Utah Court of Appeals, the Court having found the same to be 
reasonably and necessarily incurred. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff recover no costs on 
appeal and his Bill of Costs filed on March 7,~ 1990, is hereby 
stricken. This order is made on the grounds and for the reasons 
that the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeeils does not specifically 
award Plaintiff costs on appeal and such costs are not recoverable 
by application of Rule 34, Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the District 
Court immediately disburse the funds now held as supersedeas bond 
in the above-entitled matter from which the sum of $26,314.72 shall 
be paid over to the Defendants and their attorney, Hans Q. 
Chamberlain, and the balance of which shall be paid over to the 
Plaintiff and his attorney, Gary W. Pendleton. 
The amount due Defendants is calculated by beginning with 
the $20,198.21 awarded to Defendants as reimbursement for that 
portion of the $30,000.00 loan which made its way into the Westside 
Nursery Account and was used to pay obligations for which Plaintiff 
was ultimately responsible, To that sum is added the attorney's 
fees awarded Defendants at trial. 
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From this sum is subtracted the attorney's fees Plaintiff 
incurred on appeal. 
Post Judgment interest (589 days at 12% per annum) is 
added to the adjusted award. 
Expressed mathematically: 
Items awarded Defendants: 
Reimbursement $20,198 . 21 
Attorney's Fees awarded Defendants 
(not modified) 10,000.00 
TOTAL AWARD $30,198.21 
Adjustments: 
Costs on appeal (none awarded) -0-
Attorney's Fees awarded Plaintiff 
on appeal $8,152.50 
TOTAL ADJUSTMENTS -8,152.50 
ADJUSTED AWARD $22,045.71 
Post Judgment Interest $4,269.01 
TOTAL DISBURSEMENT TO DEFENDANT $26,314.72 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that upon 
disbursement of the supersedeas bond as more specifically set forth 
above, all monetary judgments entered by this Court in the above-
entitled action shall be fully satisfied. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
preliminary injunction bond in the amount of $50,000.00 posted by 
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the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action is hereby exonerated and 
the surety is discharged. 
J DATED t h i s a^~~day of j t farch, 1990. 
^ p p x o v e a as t o n form and ccThtent: i 
J . I f h i l i p Evej 
D i s t r i c t Judge 
. ,V-A^ 
Hans' Q. Chamberlain 
.{ 
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